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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of economic freedom and six relevant
subcomponents of it on the risk-taking behavior of banks in the Malaysian dual banking system. It also aims
to make a comparative analysis between Islamic and conventional banks operating in this dual banking
sector. Moreover, the study is an effort to enrich the existing literature by presenting empirical evidence on
the argument that the risk-taking behavior of the two types of banks is indistinguishable given that they
operate in the same regulatory environment.
Design/methodology/approach – Secondary data of all banks operating in the Malaysian banking sector
are collected from FitchConnect database, in addition to the economic freedom index from Foundation
Heritage for the period 2011–2017. Generalized least squares technique is employed to estimate the influence
of economic freedom and the six relevant subcomponents of it on the risk-taking behavior of banks.
Findings – The level of economic freedom influenced risk-taking behavior within the banking sector as a
whole, conventional and Islamic banking sectors negatively during the study period (2011–2017). Risk-taking
behavior of conventional and Islamic banks is similar. However, conventional banks turn to be less influenced
by economic freedom level as compared to Islamic banks.
Practical implications – The government and regulators may benefit from the results by rethinking and
setting the best economic freedom index that better serves the stability of the banking system, and lessens
banks’ risk-taking inclination.
Originality/value – To the present time, this paper is thought to be of a significant contribution. Given the
argument that Islamic and conventional banks behave in the same way. This is one of the first attempts to
address this issue in light of the influence of economic freedom and six subcomponents of it on the risk-taking
behavior of banks operating in a dual banking system.
Keywords Islamic banks, Conventional banks, Economic freedom, Economic freedom subcomponents,
Risk-taking behaviour
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Economic freedom index is an indicator that represents how relaxed a country’s policies in
the eye of participants within a particular economy. It comprises ten components, namely,
trade, capital flows and foreign investment, government interventions, banking and finance,
monetary policy, property rights, government finances, wages and prices and regulation, in
addition to black market activity. Being made up of several components, the economic
freedom index embodies the main policy and institutional areas of a country; this obviously
determines a significant role for governments. Higher scores of the index reflect favorable
polices to contestability and the economy at large. To the point where freedoms permit
banks to reinforce efficiency and engage in different activities and diversify their risks, it is
anticipated that the elevated level of freedom results in a robust economy. However, higher
economic freedom scores pave the way for banks to undertake risky activities, in particular
when the institutional environment and existing regulations and supervision deform
motives of risk-taking. Therefore, too much freedom could render banks dysfunctional. Beck
et al. (2006) maintain that countries with considerable freedoms in the banking industry and
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aggregately more contestable economic policies are less probable to undergo banking crises.
Nevertheless, these policies tend to relax entry barriers, in addition to being associated with
decreasing levels of concentration in the industry.
By virtue the Shariah principle, usury (Riba or interest rate), uncertainty (Gharar), gambling
(Qimar) and deception (Maysir) are strictly prohibited to be part of an Islamic product
(Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007); this implies the possibility that Islamic banks may be inclined to
assume higher risks and likely to bring about risk concentration (Sundararajan and
Errico, 2002). Islamic banks also encounter the problem of short-term asset liability mismatches
that attributes to constraints on the money market instruments they are allowed to use.
Consequently, regardless of the fact that the environment for economic freedom is the same for
conventional and Islamic banks, restrictions on both assets and liabilities sides could control
their risk-taking appetite. Nevertheless, Akthar Aziz (2009) argued that the tied linkage
between financial transactions and productive flows implied in Islamic finance was effective in
protecting them from the negative consequences of the 2007–2009 financial crisis. In support of
this, Sufian and Zulkhibri (2011) reported that economic freedom influences the performance of
Islamic banks positively. Accordingly, Islamic banks could be more risk-taking inclined as
compared to their conventional counterparts.
The main purpose of the present paper is to add to the earlier literature on banks
risk-taking, particularly for emerging economies in terms of establishing empirical evidence
on the role of economic freedom and its subcomponents relevant to the financial aspect in
determining the risk-taking behavior of conventional and Islamic banks operating in the same
regulatory environment. Since the research is limited to the Malaysian banking system
context, a dual banking system, this allows making a comparison between two different
systems, namely conventional and Islamic in light of how their risk-taking is influenced by the
level of economic freedom and the relevant subcomponents. Up to the present time, the
influence of economic freedom and its subcomponents on risk-taking of banks has not been
investigated sufficiently. For a dual banking system, this is the very first attempt to address
this gap as a comparative analysis between conventional and Islamic banks.
This study is of great importance not only for the government as it is the main controller
of the level of its economic openness but also for banks being the major controller of
financial flows as they hold a percentage exceeding 70 of the financial system in Malaysia.
It goes without saying that the linkage between banking sector soundness and growth of
the economy is very decisive; therefore, the banking sector’s health is crucial. In addition,
investigating the role of economic freedom and its relevant subcomponents in determining
the risk appetite of banks is significant for the government, policy makers and regulators.
The remaining of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review,
which commences with an overview of the market structure change in Malaysia, and then it
sheds light on the literature pertinent to the influence of economic freedom and its relevant
subcomponents to the financial aspect of the risk-taking of banks. Section 3 is on data
and variables, followed by Section 4, methodology. Section 5 provides comprehensive
discussions of the results as well as a comparison between Islamic and conventional banks’
risk-taking. Lastly, concluding remarks and policy implications are in Section 6.
2. Literature review
2.1 Market structure change in the Malaysian banking sector
The banking industry in Malaysia has undergone an accelerating liberalization process, this
surge, in turn, led to a quick expansion in business reflected in the immense increase in the
portfolio of loans as well as operations. Given the robust principles and the huge local
demand within the banking sector of Malaysia, the banking industry assisted banks in
getting their operations expanded toward foreign financial markets regardless of the




For motivating mergers of small-sized local banks, in the 1990s a two-tier banking
system was introduced by Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), this marked the onset of
consolidation in the Malaysian banking sector (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999). Nevertheless,
this initiative did not work out, as a few mergers were carried out to capitalize on the
advantages of tier-one banking group status (Sufian, 2007). There were only three banking
mergers given the tier-1 institutions status: DCB Bank with Kwong Yik Bank[1], DCB
Finance with Kwong Yik Finance and United Overseas Bank with Chung Khiaw Bank,
resulting in both DCB Bank and Kwong Yik Bank granted the tier-1 institutions status[2].
Sufian (2007) stated that the smaller banks with the tier-2 status had increased their capital
to gradate to tier-1 status. Furthermore, to guarantee enough return on capital, considerable
tier-2 banks have been lending unwisely and, as a result, endured huge losses throughout
the Asian financial crisis (Sufian, 2007). In the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis,
and in order to scale down the likely effects of systemic banks upon the banking sector, tight
measures were adopted to compel incorporated local banks to merge (Bank Negara
Malaysia, 1999). Consequently, a further merger plan was introduced where local banking
institutions were demanded to form their merger and point a leader (Bank Negara Malaysia,
1999). In response to this plan, ten domestic banking groups were granted acceptance.
In spite of this, BNM stated that it would still take part directly to single out partners if
banks do not manage to accomplish the mergers. Ten anchor banks were chosen, each bank
possessed minimum shareholders’ funds of RM2bn and an asset base of at least RM25bn
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999). The number of local banks declined considerably as a result
of establishing these ten banking groups to only 29 banking institutions, ten finance
companies, ten commercial banks and nine merchant banks. The banking sector of
Malaysia has seen a considerable market structure change in the aftermath of the
consolidation process of the banking sector. In this regard, the consolidation process is
marked as a structural amendment of the local banking sector. The number of banks
dropped after the consolidation process, whereas the market concentration augmented
considerably. The Malaysian banking sector consolidation is mainly marked by horizontal
mergers among banks, this in turn gave rise to overlapping market partition. In addition, the
process has led to the creation of many chief banks and/or financial holding companies, and
therefore a broad distribution of bank size.
The financial landscape in Malaysia has witnessed a dramatic change. Malaysia has
successfully implemented a dual banking system and has set itself as the forerunner country
to adopt a full-fledged Islamic system running alongside the conventional banking system.
Islamic banking has gained its importance and has been on an advanced upward trend.
Starting from 2005, the Islamic banking industry has experienced an annual growth, at an
average rate, of 18.8 percent in terms of assets, 12.1 percent in terms of financing, and 18.2
percent in terms of deposits (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2016). Based on Table I, the number of
players in the Malaysian banking system landscape has experienced some changes. The
number of commercial banks declined from 27 to 22 in the year 2006, then it remained
constant until the year 2010 where it increased to 23 participants, 25 in the year 2011, after
that, namely from the year 2012–2017 the number was stable at 27 commercial banks. For
investment banks, it has witnessed an increase of five participants, then it decreased
throughout the period 2012–2017 to just ten players. On the other hand, Islamic banks
increased from six participants in the year 2005 to 17 participants by the year 2017. This
increase in the number of Islamic banks is due to the introduction of Islamic banks’
subsidiaries as well as allowing foreign banks to participate in the Malaysian banking system.
This signifies that Islamic banks’ market share has considerably increased in the Malaysian
banking system, which in turn has implications in terms of competition and concentration.
Even though the number of empirical studies on concentration in the banking sector has





adopt a dual banking system. To this end, the sub-objective of this study is to investigate
concentration conditions in the dual banking system of Malaysia to provide evidence on two
banking systems coexisting in the same environment. Especially after the Islamic banking
sector has witnessed considerable growth and development in Malaysia, where it has been
gaining more market power in the face of the fierce competitive conventional sector. In
contrast, previous studies (Majid and Sufian, 2007; Fah and Ariff, 2017; Ibrahim et al., 2019)
have investigated concentration focusing on the entire banking sector along with the
conventional sector, or they have focused on commercial banks or the ten largest banks in the
banking industry. In addition, other studies have focused on one sector only, i.e., Islamicsector
(Majid and Sufian, 2007; Mohammed et al., 2015), conventional sector (Gajurel and Pradhan,
2012; Sharma and Bal, 2010). Although there are studies that used concentration measures to
measure competition (Hakim and Chkir, 2014) and that examined both the banking system
(Uddin and Suzuki, 2014), comparative studies that took into consideration both banking
systems are still limited, particularly for an emerging economy like Malaysia.
2.2 Economic freedom and the banking system in light of risk-taking behavior
Knight (1921) was one of the earliest authors to give a definition to risk-taking; he was the first
to coin a precise definition of risks and uncertainties. He defines risk and risk-taking as follows:
“Risks and risk-taking are two co-related while relatively independent concepts. The core
proposition of enterprise decision making is how to maximize the values under the condition of
limited internal resources. At the same time companies have to face external uncertainties,
which may bring either benefits or losses.” Schonberg et al. (2011) define risk as the exposure to
negative outcomes, or/and the variations of outcomes due to the undertaken decision.
A prominent measure for countries’ policies ranking is an economic freedom index.
Information on this index can be obtained from The Heritage Foundation. Values of the
index indicate how liberal or stringent an economy is, with an elevated score representing a
highly free economy and suitability for contestability. Furthermore, as a part of the index,
banking freedom does not include as much information as those contained in economic
freedom. Banks are free at a point where they can pursue different activities as well as
diversifying their risks; we anticipate an elevated score to enhance banking stability
through relaxed constrains. However, it is true that a high score indicates that banks are
inclined to take higher risk, in particular, if the institutional sphere, regulations and
supervision deform risk-taking motives. Soedarmono et al. (2013) in addition to results
Year Commercial banks Investment banks Islamic banksa
2005 27 10 6
2006 22 10 10
2007 22 14 11
2008 22 15 17
2009 22 15 17
2010 23 15 17
2011 25 15 16
2012 27 13 16
2013 27 12 16
2014 27 11 16
2015 27 11 16
2016 27 11 16
2017 27 10 17
Notes: aPresently, there are 16 Islamic banks – 11 subsidiaries, 2 full-fledged local banks and 3 full-fledged
foreign banks (Ibrahim et al., 2019)
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia (2016)
Table I.
Change in the






pertinent to other variables showed that economic freedom and stock market capitalization
do not necessarily hinder the degree of market power in the banking industry. Specifically,
both factors positively impact the degree of market power in the banking industry. Beck
et al. (2006) maintain that elevated freedoms in banking sector – in other words, more
contestable economic policies – are less probable to bring about banking instability.
Economic freedom and its impact on risk-taking of banks have not been investigated
extensively in the previous studies related to risk-taking. The subtle point that has not been
sufficiently unveiled is whether and how economic freedom is related to bank risk-taking,
particularly in a dual banking system. Index of economic freedom is made up of a variety of
components; therefore, it mirrors major institutional and policy areas of a given country, this
apparently reflects a significant role for the government. In this regard, one issue that
widely draws the attention is the linkage between economic freedom, especially its
subcomponents related to the financial aspect and risk-taking appetite of banks. From the
financial perspective, the rationale for the hypothesized linkage between financial freedom
(FF) and risk-taking of banks is not clear, a priori. In contrast, the lenient restrictions
encountered by financial institutions on how to handle their business, most probabily they
will adopt risks proportionate with their risk appetite; however, higher freedom may give
rise to high risk-taking. Following the financial suppression argument of McKinnon–Shaw,
deep government intervention can constrain the free competition of market forces and
restrain bank innovative activity (e.g. novel products and services). Consequently, banks
may be tempted to accept higher risks so that they compensate for decreasing margins. The
statements for economic freedom give rise to alleviation in bank risk-taking are no less
persuasive. Kim and Santomero (1988), for instance, have noticed that the linkage between
risk-taking and capital could be negative. In such a situation, despite the fact that the levels
of economic freedom may be high, risk-averse banks with high capital levels may be less
motivated to take on higher risks. Similarly, if the banking system is already over-extended,
regulators could impose “speed limits” on credit growth (Honohan, 2000), so that even with
elevated economic freedom, risk inclination may not be proportionally high.
The relationship between economic freedom and behavior of a wide range of variables has
been conducted sufficiently in literature at two levels, namely individual country level as well
as the cross-national level. Country case-based research proposesthat overall economic freedom
places a positive impact on the profitability of Chinese banks (Sufian and Habibullah, 2010).
On the other hand, considering cross-national samples, Carey and Stulz (2006) report that
economic freedom makes banks able to enhance levels of efficiency. De Haan and Sturm (2003)
investigate the implications of crises on economic freedom in a case study for Norway and
Sweden, employing cross-country regressions. They offered evidence to behold that economic
freedom declines after a crisis but increases afterwards. Sufian and Hassan (2012) examine the
implications of economic freedom for banks’ intermediation costs for ASEAN countries during
1994–2008. They concluded that economic freedom enhances the environment accompanied by
entrepreneurship and innovation and as a sequence places a positive effect on sustainable
economic development. Utilizing data for the period 1976–2008, Baier et al. (2012) stated that a
one-unit rise in the overall index of economic freedom is accompanied with about three
percentage points decrease in the likelihood of banking crises occurrence. These studies
motivated us to look into the manner economic freedom and its relevant subcomponents exert
influence on the risk-taking behavior of both Islamic and conventional banks in a dual banking
system (banks operating in the same economic environment).
Economic Freedom (ECOFREE) is one of the tool variables for LERNER rather than the
Banking Freedom indicator employed by Berger et al. (2009), given that the Economic
Freedom index made up of a wider collection of economic openness measures compared to
the Banking Freedom index. ECOFREE is a composite index of ten indicators ranking





policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices,
property rights, regulation and black market activity. The index ranges from 0 to 100 with
greater scores showing policies being more favorable to competition and economic freedom.
Soedarmono et al. (2013) stated that economic freedom and stock market capitalization
(stock) do not necessarily curb the level of market power in the banking industry.
Particularly, both economic freedom and stock positively affect the level of market power
(competition) in the banking sector.
The index of economic freedom generally comprises ten constituents assorted into four
wide groups: Rule of Law; Limited Government; Regulatory Efficiency and Open Markets.
It is scored on a scale of 0–100, where 100 implies the absolute freedom; free 80–100; mostly
free 70–79.9; moderately free 60–69.9; mostly unfree 50–59.9; and repressed 0–49.9. The
Malaysian economic freedom score is 74.5, setting the Malaysian economy the 22nd freest in
2018. However, its score has declined by 0.7 point, with higher scores for trade freedom and
fiscal health offsetting a decrease in the business freedom indicator. In the Asia–Pacific
region Malaysia is classified 6th among 43 countries, and its overall score is higher than the
regional and world averages. In its report (2018), the Institute for Democracy and Economic
Affairs (IDEAS) commented on Malaysia’s decline in the classification from 65 to 79 for the
current year out of 162 countries, covered in the annual report issued by Canada’s Fraser
Institute. IDEAS Chief Executive Ali Salman said even though the classification was
constructed relying on 2016–2017 data, the classification presented how the private sector
had been “squeezed,” businesses hampered and share of the government augmented. This
sharp decline raises a very critical question, Is it imperative to review the Malaysian
economic policies? In this study, we address this in light of banks’ risk-taking to figure out
whether high economic freedom curbs banks’ motivation to engage in risky activities.
“Where people are free to pursue their own opportunities and make their own choices, they
leadmore prosperous, happier and healthier lives,” said FredMcMahon, DrMichael A.Walker
Research Chair in Economic Freedom with the Fraser Institute (Syahirah, 2018). It is
understood that high economic freedom leads to a more prosperous economy at large.
However, economic freedommeans the easy entry of new rivals into the local economy, which
in turn fuels competition and thereby causes concentration to shrink due to the increase in the
number of players. Economic freedom’s impact on the banking sector in terms of risk-taking
has not been addressed within the banking sector of Malaysia. Thus, in this study, we shed
light on the implication of economic freedom and some of its relevant subcomponents on both
Islamic and conventional banks risk-taking. We aim to look into the response of the two types
of banks to change in the level of economic freedom and its six relevant subcomponents.
Figure 1 shows that economic freedom in Malaysia has been on a rising trend. However,
the global ranking has experienced a decline of 14 positions; this implies that businesses
have been hindered and government intervention increased.
2.3 Economic freedom index components and bank risk-taking
In addition to the general index of economic freedom, this study considers six
subcomponents, namely five related to financial activities, whereas the sixth reflects
government integrity. This is to figure out which subcomponent turns to be of a great
contribution to the determination of banks’ risk-taking.
Business freedom reflects the right of individuals or entities to set up and conduct business
without encountering much intervention from the government. Heavy and excessive
regulation imposed by the state is among the most common impediments to conduct business
activities freely. The higher the business freedom score, the lower the regulation burden
individual and business entities have to endure – in other words, lower cost of outputs. The
business environment is easy to predict in an environment where business freedom is high in




and obtaining a license for a new business is effortless and costless. Nevertheless, in an open
economy the government only intervenes in certain necessary matters such as typical
decision-making or price-setting procedure (Heritage Foundation, 2016). Intuitively,
governments constraints imposed on business activities could induce corporates to promote
their risk-taking by extending more loans (increasing loan portfolio riskiness) in order to
maintain intermediation margins or boost their market share.
Monetary freedom necessitates the stability of the country’s currency as well as
market-determined prices. A stable currency is as vitally important for entrepreneurs as
it is for consumers. A reliable currency is a key to long-term value and accumulative capital.
It is taken as a given that the currency of any given country is crucially affected by its
monetary policy. A sound monetary policy that leads to stable prices, maintain inflation
within reasonable boundaries and safe the wealth of the country makes it easy and possible
for people to accurately predict their plans with regard to investments and savings.
In contrast, adopting an inflationary policy could lead to burdensome consequences
embodied in invisible taxes and instable prices, elevated costs of conducting business,
misallocation of resources and therefore diminishing the wealth of the country. There is not
an ideal monetary policy agreed upon. Presently, low inflation and independency of the
central banks are desired, in addition to the widespread notion that price controls are
effective in curbing corruption in the market; however, they lead to either surpluses or
shortages (Heritage Foundation, 2016). Long periods characterized by low interest rates
(expansionary monetary policy) could induce banks to engage in risky activities through
increasing collateral value or yield searching (Borio and Zhu, 2012; Rajan, 2010).
FF is about the reassurance of a sound financial system through the accessibility of
credit, diversity of savings, ease of payment and quality of services extended to individuals.
A free banking environment induces competition, thereby leading to efficient intermediation
between units with a surplus (individuals, companies and governments) and those with
shortage, especially investors and entrepreneurs. Driven by forces of supply and demand,
markets offer timely information related to prices, especially for rectifying badly made
decisions. Therefore, the entire process relies on the level of transparency within the market
as well as the reliability of the extended information. Strict requirements of disclosure and
independency of auditing guarantee prudent and effective regulatory system. The essential
role of the government is ensuring disclosure, transparency and integrity among banking






























mentioned points, namely transparency and integrity, will most probably lead to curb
contestability, efficiency and increase costs of financing activities. For example, the
intervention of the government in determining the pricing of capital within the stock market
(Heritage Foundation, 2016). Intuitively, a higher score of FF could lead to a considerable
variation in the profits and therefore higher risk appetite.
Investment freedom reflects business opportunities and motivations for economic
activities diversity, high levels of productivity and job chances. An inductive environment
where equity and transparency prevail, all companies regardless of their size and type are
treated equally induces contestability and innovation. By contrast, domestic and
international constraints on capital movement cause a decline in productivity, bring
about instability in making a decision and resources misallocation. In addition, constraints
on cross-border-based business activities lead to dwindle in growth opportunities. Having
freedom for where and how to invest makes capital flow, allocation and use efficient results
in greater returns. In essence, investment restrictions imposed by governments result in a
decent level of entrepreneurial activity (Heritage Foundation, 2016). Higher Investment
freedom score implies easy access to the market, and hence cost efficiency. However, in
contrast, it could induce banks to engage in excessive risk.
Tax burden: the government imposes direct taxes (income tax rates) and indirect taxes
(payroll, sales and excise taxes, as well as tariffs and the value-added tax). Tax burden is
considered as an impediment to the economic freedom of individuals and companies. It is
measured as the relative percentage of all forms of taxes to GDP (Heritage Foundation, 2016).
In other words, tax burden reflects the fiscal burden on business activities. A higher score of
tax burden implies a hurdle encountering the ability of corporates and individuals to conduct
business and achieve their goals in the market, therefore lowering their scope of activities.
Government integrity is one of the fundamental components that reflect the rule of law
within a country. The higher the score of this subcomponent of economic freedom index, the
more suitable and supporting the environment is within the country to conduct business
and related activities. In other words, government integrity reflects how corrupt the market
is within that government. People or groups of special interest could gain huge profits at the
price of other propel, groups and society at large. Corruption, be it political or economic,
often steams from the concentration of power in the government. It appears in different
shapes, for example, nepotism, patronage, graft, cronyism and theft. Corruption and
government intervention in the economy are interrelated. For instance, too much and
unnecessary regulations give plenty of room for theft or graft. Moreover, constraints by the
government in some areas only could lead to the creation of informal markets (shadow
economy) in other areas. For instance, constraints by the governments that lead to higher
costs of transactions may motivate theft and illicit market relationships. In general,
transparency is the key to boosting efficiency and the establishment of equal treatment
(Heritage Foundation, 2016). Massive direct control by the government could be of a
destabilizing effect threat to the banking system due to the excessive government
intervention, which in turn leads to inefficiencies and explicit corruption (Miles et al., 2006).
Figure 2 shows the trend of economic freedom index subcomponents in Malaysia that are
used in this study over the period 2011–2017. It is clear from the figure that the Malaysian
economy is characterized with burdensome taxes, free monetary policy that reflects a stable
currency as well as reasonable inflation and mostly free business freedom that reflects
easiness of starting business activities in the country – in other words getting a license to
establish a business. On the other hand, government integrity is the lowest (repressed)
among all the subcomponents. This is very crucial as it reflects the rule of law and how
corrupt the market is. FF and investment freedom (mostly unfree) are also the lowest after
government integrity. These two subcomponents/financial-related subcomponents are also




capital flows, access to market, accessibility of credit and diversity of savings. Apparently,
the Malaysian regulator imposes tight constraints for these subcomponents which may lead
to an inadvisable behavior among individuals and corporates, especially banks in terms of
their conduct/risk-taking behavior.
3. Data and variables
Annual bank-level data of all Malaysian banks over the period 2011–2017 are gathered from
various sources, namely FitchConnect database, economic freedom index and its
subcomponent are collected from Heritage Foundation, and one macroeconomic variable
from the World Bank, namely GDP. The overall number of banks operating in the
Malaysian banking sector with available data during the study period is 54, 17 Islamic and
37 conventional, this gives 362 yearly observations.
3.1 Dependent variable: risk-taking behavior
Our dependent variable, risk-taking behavior, the Z-score is employed which is the most
common proxy utilized in literature as a risk-taking behavior indicator, for instance, Hesse
and Čihák (2007), Lepetit et al. (2008), Schaeck et al. (2009), Laeven and Levine (2009), and
Čihák and Hesse (2010). Following Mokni et al. (2016) we compute Z-score as follows:
Zscore ¼ E ROAitð ÞþCRAit
SD ROAitð Þ
:
E(ROA) is the anticipated return on assets, CRA is the ratio of equity capital to total assets
and SD(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA. Z-score is inversely related to the
probability of bank insolvency. A bank becomes insolvent when its asset value drops
below its debt. According to Strobel (2010), the insolvency probability can be written as
P(ROA r −CAR). If we use the standardized ROA, the probability would be equal to:
P
ROAE ROAð Þ
SD ROAð Þ rZscore
 
:
Therefore, a higher Z-score indicates that the bank is experiencing a more stable status.
In order to put outliers and skewness of the distribution in control, the logarithm of the
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3.2.1 Economic freedom. Economic freedom, in essence, reflects the freedom extent of
individuals and corporates in controlling their business, namely property and labor. In an
economically free environment, people are not restricted in terms of production,
consumption, investment. Governments in such an environment characterized by faint
intervention – in other words, factors of production move freely.
Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom is used as a proxy for economic
freedom, with high index values denoting a free economy and low index values denoting a
stringent economy regulation (Sufian and Hassan, 2012). It is scored on a scale of 0–100,
where 100 implies the absolute freedom; free 80–100; mostly free 70–79.9; moderately free
60–69.9; mostly unfree 50–59.9; and repressed 0–49.9.
3.2.2 Banking concentration. The commonly employed proxy as a representative of
banking sector concentration is the so-called Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) (Bikker
and Haaf, 2002; Abbasoglu et al., 2007; Majid and Sufian 2006; Kadir et al., 2014; Mohammed
et al., 2015; Sghaier et al., 2015). HHI is a plain, yet a useful measure for the measurement of
concentration in a given industry. It is computed as the sum of the squared market shares of
all banks in a certain industry, where market share can be founded on assets, deposits or






where Si is the bank’s market share of the i firm and n represents the number of banks in the
sector. The sum of market share is 100 percent ðS2i ¼ 100%Þ. When HHI index exceeds
0.1000 the market is considered monopolistic, if it is tending toward zero the market is said
to be in a state of perfect competition. Hence, the greater the value of HHI the higher
the concentration the market undergoes. If it is below 0.1000 the market is in a state of
non-concentration, in case it falls in the range of 0.1000 and 0.1800 the market is
experiencing a moderate concentration, and if it exceeds 0.1800 the market is greatly
concentrated (Rudkevich et al., 1998).
3.2.3 Bank profitability. Concentrated banking systems are anticipated to increase bank
revenues, thereby profits, as a result, this will reduce the fragility of the bank. Hellmann
et al. (2000) and Matutes and Vives (2000) are in favor the notion that profit provides a
capital buffer to cope with adverse shocks in a financial framework which is not in a stable
situation as well as elevate the franchise value of the bank. Consequently, it restrains banks’
motives to take on exaggerated risks (Ali et al., 2018; Vives, 2010). ROA is a ratio calculated
by dividing the net income over total assets. ROA has been used in most of the studies for
the measurement of the profitability of the banks. ROA measures the profit earned per
dollar of assets and reflects how well bank management uses the bank’s real investment
resources to generate profits (Naceur, 2003; Alkassim, 2005; Gropp and Heider, 2007;
Jeitschko and Jeung, 2007; Gul et al., 2011). This ratio is defined as follows:
ROA ¼ Net income
Total assets
:
3.2.4 Capital structure. The link between the degree of risk and capital has been empirically
examined by some literature, where two contradictory results were found. The first group
detected a positive linkage between the degree of capital and risk. Godlewski (2005) studied
the association between capital and bank credit risk using a set of 30 developing countries




equation system. It was concluded that there is a positive impact between capital and risk.
In addition, Bichsel and Blum (2004) reported a positive association between alterations in
capital and risk in a sample of 19 Swiss banks during the period ranging from 1990 to 2002.
We make use of most relevant literature in bringing into play a bank’s capitalization
as gauged via the ratio of equity to total assets (Haque and Shahid, 2016; Selma Mokni
et al., 2016). Accordingly, book value of equity/total assets is used as a proxy for bank
capital structure, the formula is as follows:




In order to address the impact of economic freedom and banking concentration on bank
risk-taking behavior, the current research follows a panel data regression model to
determine the association between the dependent and independent variables at the industry,
Islamic and conventional levels. The panel nature of the present study data permits the
usage of panel data methodology. The method was used by several studiesin different areas
(Amidu and Abor, 2006; Asimakopoulos et al., 2009; Juan García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano,
2007; Ahmed Haji and Mohd Ghazali, 2013; MarhaYaacob and Che-Ahmad, 2012). Panel data
is a methodology that comprises the pooling of observations on units cross-section over
various time phases and provides findings that are, basically, not evident in pure time-series
or pure cross-section studies (Amidu and Abor, 2006). Asimakopoulos et al. (2009) indicated
that their method is different in terms of its equation formula form, regular cross-section, or
time-series, where each variable is attached by double subscripts. The form of panel data




where the subscript i signifies the cross-sectional element and t denotes the time-series
element. In this equation,Yi,t represents the model’s dependent variable; Xi,t contains the set of
explanatory variables in the estimation model; and αi is taken to be constant over time
t and definite to the individual cross-sectional unit i.
Models estimation from the panel data method requires that the study should first
specify whether t a correlation exists among the unobservable heterogeneity ∩i of each firm
and the model’s explanatory variables ( Juan García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2007). If a
correlation exists (fixed effects), it would be possible to get a consistent estimation using the
within-group estimator. On the other hand, random effects is a more effective estimator
which can be derived by estimating the equation by generalized least squares. The regular
method to identify whether the effects are fixed or random is to run the Hausman test under
the null hypothesis (correlation does not exist between the unobservable heterogeneity and
the model’s explanatory variables). If the null hypothesis is accepted, there would be random
effect; otherwise, the effects are regarded to be fixed. Through this way, the analysis can
achieve a more effective estimator of β ( Juan García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2007).
Selection of this methodology in the current study is due to its powerful mechanisms and
advantages that provide outputs that cannot be predictable and expected through
individual studies of either times-series or cross-section data (Amidu and Abor, 2006;
Asimakopoulos et al., 2009; Juan García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2007). In other words,
the benefits of panel data technique are rooted in the concept of this method which assumes
that corporations, individuals or countries are heterogeneous which is a fact that is not
supposed and assumed in cross-section and time-series data literature which make them





more informative data, more degrees of freedom and efficiency and less collinearity.
Furthermore, the panel data method has better statistical techniques than other methods as
it allows for more data points and it includes the investigation of a specific substance within
several spots periodically over a defined time setting (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007;
MarhaYaacob and Che-Ahmad, 2012). Following Ghosh (2016), the first model for this
study is structured as shown in the following equation:
ln Zscoreitð Þ ¼ aþb1 ln Econfreeitð Þþb2 lnðHHI assetitÞþb3 ln ROAþ1itð Þ
þb4 ln EQ=TAit
 þg1 ln Net loans=TAit þg2 ln GDPgrowth=TAit 
þg3 ln Assetitð Þþg4Dummy ownþeit ; (1)
where Z-score, independent variable, used as a proxy for risk-taking behavior, Econfree:
economic freedom, HHI asset: concentration in the market based on total assets, ROA +1:
proxy for profitability, we add 1 to avoid the elimination of negative values as we subject
variables to Ln function, EQ/TA: capital structure, Net loan/total asset: proxy for
intermediation, GDP growth rate: macroeconomic variable, Assets: to control for size,
Dummy own: A dummy variable for ownership that takes the value of one (1) if the bank is
foreign; and Zero (0) if the bank is local.
Following Molyneux et al. (2010) and Sarkar and Sensarma (2016), bank size (total assets),
the ratio of net loans/total assets, profitability (return on assets/ROA), capital structure
(total equity/total assets) and GDP growth rate are considered control variables.
In order to address the impact of economic freedom index subcomponents on risk-taking,
we selected six relevant subcomponents, namely business freedom, monetary freedom, FF,
investment freedom, tax burden and government integrity. The selection of these six
subcomponents is due to their relevance to the financial aspect. To this end, we develop the
following equation where b represents the bank, t represents the time-series element and f
the subcomponents of economic freedom index:
ln Zscoref bt
  ¼ abtþbf ln Freedomf btþb1 ln HHI assetbtð Þþg1Xbtþg2DumOwnþebt ; (2)
where Z-score represents risk-taking behavior of bank b in light of subcomponent f at
time t, α the bank-specific effect, Freedom the subcomponent of economic freedom,
HHIassetconcentration in the market based on total assets, X represents bank-specific and
macroeconomic controls (return on assets/ROA, size, capital structure (total equity/total
assets), net loans/total assets, GDP growth rate), ε: is the error term, and DumOwn
represents dummy ownership variable; it takes one (1) if the bank is foreign; and Zero (0) if
the bank is local.
The coefficient of interest in Equation (2) is βf which represents the impact exerted by
the economic index subcomponent f. Therefore, the reported results for Equation (2) will
be limited to coefficient βf in order to confirm that the total impact of the subcomponents
is corresponding with that of the entire index (coefficient β1 in Equation (1)), in
addition to figuring out which subcomponent is more significant in determining bank
risk-taking behavior.
5. Findings, analysis and discussion
5.1 Summary statistics
Table II reports the main descriptive statistics of the variable used in the first model.
The Z-score of banks is distributed with a mean value of 55.47 and standard deviation
of 47.023. The very high standard deviation signifies a very significant variation in the level
of risk-taking across banks. This also implies immense heterogeneity in the relative risk




5.2 Herfindahl–Herschman Index (HHI) based on total assets
Base on Table III and Figure 3, and with respect to concentration in the asset market, as
stipulated in the US Merger Guidelines [6] that Herfindahl indices less than 0.1000 indicates
that the market is not concentrated, between 0.1000 and 0.1800 moderatelyconcentrated and
indices above 0.1800 points out that the concentration prevails in the market (Sufian and
Shah Habibullah, 2013). Therefore, the mean values for HHI calculated based on total assets
show that the market for all banks experiences a non-concentration condition, whereas for
conventional and Islamic banks the market is moderately concentrated. Concentration for all
banks as well as conventional decreased in the first year, from 2011 to 2012 indicating a
reduction in the market power, and then it remained almost stable with slight increases for
the rest of the period. On the other hand, for Islamic banks, the market is moderately
concentrated. However, it is slightly more concentrated than conventional banks. It fell
sharply in the first year; this is an indication of the immense reduction in market power in
the Islamic banking sector. Then it showed a slight increase for the second year, from 2012
to 2013, after that it experienced a stable trend from 2013 to 2015, and for the remaining two
years of the study period, it indicates a moderate increase but it remained within the area of
moderate concentration. Concentration in the Islamic asset market is higher than that of all
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. No. of Obs.
Z-score 55.472 47.023 0.9098 253.3925 362
HHIA 0.0989 0.0087 0.0916 0.123 362
ROA 0.00759 0.03434 −0.5618 0.1660 362
EcoFree 69.32238 2.79438 66.1 73.8 362
EQ/TA 0.1550 0.1427 0.04324 0.9946 362
NetloanTA 0.4630718 0.2545469 0 1.256963 362
GDPgrowth 5.226685 0.6062522 4.22 6.007 362
Asset 53,059.72 109,747.4 22.22 765,301.8 362
Note: Numbers are in 000.000
Table II.
Summary statistics of
variables used in the
models (2011–2017)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Whole sample 0.123 0.0916 0.0930 0.0972 0.0984 0.0983 0.0980
Islamic 0.160 0.119 0.135 0.135 0.137 0.148 0.152
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banks and conventional banks due to the reasoning that there is a less considerable number
of Islamic banks that possess the great portion assets of the Islamic industry; in other
words, assets are distributed mainly among a limited number of banks. This is due to the
fact that those few banks are very competitive as compared to their rivals. On the contrary,
the mean values for both all banks and conventional bank concentrations in the assets
market are lower indicating that assets are distributed among many banks, reduction in
market power, and all banks are healthy competitors.
From a theory perspective, when the size distribution of banks indicates inequality, it is a
mark that concentration is very immense. However, in Malaysia conventional and all
banking sector concentration seems to be low as shown in Figure 3. This low concentration
is a reflection of the competitiveness in the asset market. In contrast, the Islamic banking
sector shows a relatively higher degree of concentration, which indicates a lesser
competition as compared to the whole and conventional banking sectors.
5.3 Trend of Z-score mean values
Figure 4 illustrates the behavior of Z-score values for the sector at large (BS), Islamic (Isl) and
conventional (Con) banks during the study period (2011–2017). It is very apparent from the figure
that the mean values of Z-score for the banking sector at large and conventional banks surpass
those of Islamic banks. Therefore, and according to the interpretation of Z-score, the higher the
better, Islamic banks are more prone to insolvency compared to conventional ones. Z-score mean
values behavior of conventional banks surpass those of the banking sector and both moves in a
parallel direction; this implies that the dominance of conventional banks over the banking sector
is very clear because as Islamic banks Z-score values are added to conventional values the trend
still follows in the same pattern as that of conventional banks z-score.
5.4 Regression results
Table IV reports the results of the first model for all categories of banks. We report a
random effect model results based on Breusch–Pagan LM and Huasman tests. Economic
freedom exerts a negative impact on risk-taking for both Islamic and conventional banks;
however, it is more severe for Islamic banks. When the economy is free, it is open for new
contestants, this in turn fuels competition. The results show that concentration influences
risk-taking negatively – that means causing a decline in Z-score (getting closer to default).
For Islamic banks, the influence is greater than the one placed on conventional banks. This
may attribute to the fact that Islamic banks get engaged in riskier activities because of its
complicate models of business, or due to the lack of many financial instruments being
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significant impact for the whole sector, conventional and Islamic banks. However, in terms
of magnitude, the impact is remarkably higher than shown for all banks and conventional
banks; this is not surprising as most of the Islamic contracts are equity based. The
ownership dummy variable is insignificant; this signifies that there are no differences
between foreign and domestic Islamic banks when it comes to risk-taking.
A higher level of economic freedom means a more flexible economy in terms of entry of
new rivals into the banking arena, thereby fueling competition. Economic freedom for
Malaysian is ranked the 12th in the world with a level of 74.5 out of 100 in the year 2018
suggesting the considerable economic freedom, and it is ranked 6th among 43 countries in the
Asia–Pacific region, and its overall score is above the regional and world averages (Heritage
Foundation, 2016). On the other hand, Malaysian FF ranged between 50 and 60 during the
study period; this implies that the Malaysian central banks have a burdensome task
supervising and regulating the financial sector, with the insufficient capability to prevent
fraud and enforcement of contracts. The government practices very active control over banks
with a considerable ownership share of the whole sector. During the sample period, the
economic freedom index exhibited an increasing trend from 66.3 to 73.8. This increasing trend
implies that the sign of economic freedom impact in the regression results matches the
set hypothesis that economic freedom exerts a negative impact on Z-score (distance
to default) – in other words, it fosters bank appetite toward risk, so they can survive in
the market, these results are supported by Ghosh (2016). The impact varies according to the
type of bank. For conventional banks, the impact seems to be lower than that of Islamic ones;
this is due to the fact that conventional banks are better rivals compared to Islamic ones.
This is not surprising as Islamic banking is still in its infancy stage (this notion is still
controversial). In addition, the instruments being used by Islamic banks are still limited due to
compliance with shariah principle and prohibition of interest in comparison with an
abundance of instruments available for conventional banks. Furthermore, Islamic banks have
many exposures in addition to those conventional banks are exposed to. Business activities of
Islamic banks are more complex and consider due diligence owing to being bound by shariah
principles (mainly they are built on the basis of risk-sharing; however, in practice, this is still







Constant 14.61 (5.56)*** 17.32 (2.45)** 14.80 (5.73)***
LnEconfree −2.95 (−5.08)*** −4.02 (−2.21)** −2.78 (−4.34)***
LnHHIasset −0.12 (−0.34) −0.52 (−0.64) 0.22 (1.16)
LnROA+1 3.42 (9.25)*** 13.54 (2.13)** 3.24 (10.56)***
LnEqasset 0.99 (6.45)*** 1.76 (2.05)** 0.88 (8.9)***
LnnetloawnTA 0.046 (1.73) −0.18 (−0.60) 0.056 (1.88)*
LnGDPgrowth 0.28 (2.79)*** 0.008 (0.03) 0.37 (3.34)***
Logasset 0.16 (0.77) 0.93 (0.90) 0.017 (0.15)
Dumown 0.25 (1.28) −0.12 (−0.22) 0.47 (2.08)
Breusch–Pagan LM test 658.31 (0.0000) 154.94 (0.0000) 532.46 (0.0000)
Hausman test 2.25 (0.9446) 2.78 (0.9049) 1.28 (0.9890)
Observations 362 144 248
Multicollinearity (vif ) 1.49 2.19 1.74
Hetero ( χ2-stat) Vce cluster (robustness) Vce cluster (robustness) Vce cluster (robustness)
Wald test 377.00 (0.0000) 12.77 (0.1202) 385.69 (0.0000)
R2 (within) 0.38 0.23 0.62
F-statistics 32.84 (0.0000) 2.08 (0.044) 385.69 (0.0000)
Notes: *,**,***Significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively
Table IV.











5.5 Impact of economic freedom subcomponents on risk-taking behavior
Table V reports the summary statistics of economic freedom index components. It is clear
from the table that business freedom and investment freedom are of a high variation. This
may be an implication for difficulties in projections and fluctuations of the Malaysia
economic environment. In contrast, tax burden shows the lowest standard deviation (0.32)
and the highest mean (84.79) on a scale of 100, which maybe an indication of how
burdensome taxes in Malaysia are.
Table VI reports the regression results of the impact of economic freedom index
subcomponents on risk-taking behavior (Z-score). Based on the standard errors clustered at
the bank level, and based on both Breusch–Pagan LM and Hausman tests, random effects
seem superior over fixed effects due to the non-correlation between regressors and time-
invariant bank-specific variables.
Remarkably, all components exert a significant negative impact on the banking sector at
large, Islamic and conventional banks, except for tax burden which turns to be insignificant
for the whole banking sector and Islamic banks. The estimated result for the subcomponents
corresponds with the estimated result of the entire index, economic freedom index.
For conventional banks, all subcomponents exert a significant negative impact on risk-
taking at a 1 percent significance level. On the other hand, for Islamic banks, all subcomponents
exert a significant negative impact on risk-taking at a 5 percent level of significance, except for
monetary freedom and tax burden, which turn to be insignificant, yet they are influencing risk-
taking negatively.
Governments with excessive intervention with the market forces lead to less flexibility
with regard to decision making, in addition to suppression of innovative activities for banks
in terms of novel services and products. Consequently, banks are induced to engage in risky
activities in the asset portfolio in order to compensate for diminishing profit margins.
Variable Mean SD Min. Max.
Economic freedom index 69.32 2.79 66.1 73.8
Business freedom 48.72 7.63 69.7 93.5
Monetary freedom 82.06 1.92 79.8 85.3
Financial freedom 54.47 4.98 50 60
Investment freedom 52.41 6.44 45 60
Government integrity 47.23 3.70 43 52











Economic freedom R2 EF
subcomponents −2.95 (−5.08)*** 0.38 −4.02 (−2.21)** 0.23 −2.78 (−4.34)*** 0.62
Business freedom R2 −1.39 (−5.17)*** 0.37 −1.82 (−2.58)** 0.23 −1.30 (−4.68)*** 0.62
Monetary freedom R2 −2.76 (−3.72)*** 0.35 −2.81 (−1.25) 0.18 −2.60 (−3.14)*** 0.57
Financial freedom R2 −0.74 (−4.07)*** 0.34 −0.84 (−2.00)** 0.19 −0.62 (−3.70)*** 0.57
Investment freedom R2 −0.95 (−5.21)*** 0.38 −1.25 (−2.24)** 0.23 −0.90 (−4.55)*** 0.62
Government integrity R2 −1.36 (−4.88)*** 0.37 −1.75 (−2.24)** 0.22 −1.25 (−3.94)*** 0.60
Tax burden R2 −4.46 (−1.51) 0.32 −0.52 (−0.06) 0.17 −6.09 (−2.02)** 0.55
No. of observations 362 144 248
Notes: Economic freedom index and its components are subject to LN. All regressions include all bank-level
and macroeconomic controls; however, these are not reported. *,**,***Significance level at 10, 5 and 1 percent
levels, respectively
Table VI.












A low government integrity score reflects how deep the government engages in redundant
regulation as well as a sign of a dysfunctional market in terms of information and shadow
economy, and maybe special interest groups.
In Figure 2, two subcomponents of economic freedom index show openness, namely
business freedom, monetary freedom, in addition to a high tax burden. On the other hand,
the other three subcomponents, namely investment freedom, FF, in addition to the low
integrity of the government show very restricted conditions and deep interference with the
market forces. Despite the fact that business freedom is high, it exerts a negative impact on
the risk-taking of banks regardless of their type. This may signify that huge business
freedom lends more room for banks to engage in risky activities. However, this also may
attribute to the restricted financial and investment freedom as they are very low, in addition
to the high tax burden. High risk-taking could be fueled with increasing level of business
freedom as it leads to variability in profits, and therefore higher risk-taking in the hope to
compensate for decreasing profit margins. Monetary freedom turns to be insignificant
except for conventional banks, this may attribute to the fact that conventional banks are
very sensitive to interest rate variation being a fundamental component of monetary policy
and the core income of conventional banks. Conventional banks extend loans and charge
interest on it. Monetary freedom in Malaysia based on Figure 2 is considerably high, and
hence allowing plenty of room for banks to give out more loans, especially conventional
ones, which in turn prompt their risk-taking, or perhaps conventional banks extend
excessive loans in order to maintain their market share or increase it.
All subcomponents’ effects on Islamic banks surpass those on conventional banks,
except for taxes burden, which is insignificant for Islamic banks, but significant and severe
for conventional banks.
To sum up, the economic freedom index and its relevant components exert a similar
impact on both Islamic and conventional banks. The effect is slightly higher for Islamic
banks as compared to conventional ones. Nevertheless, the behavior of conventional and
Islamic banks is identical in light of the impact of economic freedom and its relevant
subcomponents on risk-taking of banks. It is not surprising due to a number of reasons.
First, conventional banks dominate the banking landscape in Malaysia; they are also better
off in terms of the availability and variety of financial instruments used when engaging in
contracts as opposed to Islamic banks that have to only deal with instruments that comply
with Shariah principle (Islamic law). Second, the Islamic business model is complex being
restricted to work under shariah principles. Third, both types of banks are operating in the
same environment where dominance is for conventional banks. In the context of Malaysia,
the results suggest a fundamental role of policy makers and regulators. While an open
economy can boost performance, it can also fuel banks’ inclination towards engaging in
risky activities. Hence, government intervention should be reasonable where it does not
jeopardize nor allowing vast room for banks to engage in risky activities so that it can
maintain banking system soundness.
6. Conclusion and policy implications
By using data of all banks in the dual banking system of Malaysia covering the period
2011–2017, the present study investigates economic freedom impact on the banking sector
at large and make a comparison between risk-taking behavior (Z-score) of Islamic and
conventional banks in light of the impact exerted by the former on the latter. The findings
reveal that economic freedom and its six relevant subcomponents place a negative influence
risk-taking on both Islamic and conventional banks and the banking system at large in
Malaysia. However, the magnitude of the exerted impact varies between the two types of
banks. Conventional banks appear to be slightly less influenced compared to Islamic banks.





that better serves the soundness of banks by curbing their risk-taking excessiveness. For
conventional banks, tax burden, monetary freedom, business freedom and government
integrity, respectively, are very significant and crucial in determining risk-taking. In
contrast, for Islamic banks, monetary freedom, business freedom, government dignity,
investment freedom, respectively, are the most important subcomponents that determine
the risk-taking of banks.
Banking sector concentration exerts a negative but insignificant impact on risk-taking.
Both ROA and capital structure exert a positive favorable impact on Z-score for both banks;
however, conventional banks are better off in terms of distance to default as compared to
Islamic banks. This is not surprising as conventional banks are the dominant of the
Malaysian banking sector by virtue of their experience and being in existence prior to
Islamic banks, which are still in a position looking for more market share.
The findings of the study have important policy implications. In light of the increased
concentration out of acquisition and merger processes that have impinged on the banking
sector of Malaysia, regulators, policy makers and banks managements are in search of best
practices in order to allocate and use their resources in way that ensures better performance
and stability, thereby soundness of the entire banking system. Policy makers and regulators
are recommended to look into the level of economic freedom through investigating its
subcomponents. This can be fulfilled by investigating and setting best thresholds for
economic freedom index subcomponents that better serve stability and lessen banks’
inclination towards risk-taking. The findings, implicitly, suggest that government interference
with business activities has a considerable influence on banks’ risk-taking behavior.
Further research could be conducted in terms of deciding on the best level of economic
freedom that ensures less risk-taking inclination by banks of different types but operating in
the same regulatory environment in a way that leads to boosting productivity, efficiency and
stability. This would not be an easy task as the technique to be used in determining the level
of economic freedom has to be chosen with due care due to the sensitivity of the implications.
Notes
1. Rashid Hussain Bank (RHB) resulted out of a merger that took place between DCB Bank and
Kwong Yik Bank as the second-largest bank, and later agreed to buy Sime Bank, which underwent
huge losses during the second half of 1997.
2. As of the end of 1997, ten commercial banks were given the tier-1 status.
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